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Nontechnical Summary 
 
Existing evidence suggests that workers face a low risk of experiencing a real wage reduction. 
However, there is so far virtually no evidence whether some employee groups are affected 
stronger by wage cuts than other groups. Insider–outsider and several branches of efficiency 
wage theory predict selective wage cuts especially for employees who are less important for 
firm performance, whereas some recent contributions discard selective wage reductions and 
stress fairness considerations instead. In this paper, we investigate whether employers who 
(have to) reduce real wages do so in a selective manner. Using German linked employer–
employee panel data for the homogenous group of young workers in the first five years of 
their first job, we fit linear models for individuals’ probability of experiencing a real wage cut. 
We include plant fixed effects that control for permanent differences in plants’ wage policies. 
We find clear evidence that plants resort to selective wage reductions. Medium-skilled and 
especially high-skilled workers are less likely to face a real wage reduction than low-skilled 
workers. The same holds for workers who have just recently been hired. Adding workers’ 
wage residual estimated from an extended Mincerian wage regression for the previous year as 
a measure of unobserved worker performance, we further find that workers with a higher 
residual have a significantly lower incidence of real wage cuts. Notably, the very same 
selectivity pattern shows up when restricting our analysis to firms covered by collective 
agreements or having a works council. Our finding is clearly in line with insider–outsider and 
several branches of efficiency wage theory. It is at odds, however, with fairness 
considerations pressing employers to selectively reduce wages such that wage dispersion 
among peers is reduced. We thus conclude that real wage reductions, though rare in general, 
are specifically aimed at those groups of workers who are less crucial to firm performance.  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die bisherige Literatur deutet darauf hin, dass reale Lohnreduktionen relativ selten sind. Es 
gibt bisher jedoch kaum Evidenz dazu, ob einige Beschäftigtengruppen stärker von 
Lohnreduktionen betroffen sind als andere. Insider–Outsider- und unterschiedliche Versionen 
von Effizienzlohntheorien sagen vorher, dass Lohnreduktionen selektiv und besonders bei 
Beschäftigtengruppen konzentriert sind, die für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Arbeitgebers 
nicht so wichtig sind. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir, ob Arbeitgeber, die 
Reallohnkürzungen durchführen (müssen), dies selektiv tun. Auf der Basis von verknüpften 
Arbeitgeber–Arbeitnehmer-Paneldaten für die homogene Gruppe junger Arbeitnehmer in den 
ersten fünf Jahren ihrer ersten Beschäftigung schätzen wir lineare Modelle zur Erklärung der 
individuellen Wahrscheinlichkeit, eine reale Lohnreduktion zu erhalten. Hierbei 
berücksichtigen wir unternehmensfixe Effekte, um für permanente Unterschiede bei den 
Lohnpolitiken der Unternehmen zu kontrollieren. Wir finden deutliche Hinweise auf selektive 
Lohnreduktionen. Beschäftigte mit einer mittleren Qualifikation und insbesondere 
Beschäftigte mit einer hohen Qualifikation sind weniger gefährdet, eine Reallohnkürzung zu 
erfahren im Vergleich zu Beschäftigten mit einer niedrigen Qualifikation. Das Gleiche gilt für 
Beschäftigte, die gerade erst eingestellt wurden. Wir ergänzen das Lohnresidual eines 
Beschäftigten aus einer erweiterten Mincergleichung für das vergangene Jahr als Maß für die 
unbeobachtbare Leistung dieses Mitarbeiters. Hierbei finden wir, dass Beschäftigte mit einem 
höheren Residuum ein signifikant niedrigeres Risiko einer Lohnreduktion haben. 
Bemerkenswerterweise zeigen sich die gleichen Selektivitätsmuster für die Subgruppen 
tarifgebundener Betriebe und solcher mit einem Betriebsrat. Unsere Ergebnisse decken sich 
mit den Hypothesen aus der Insider–Outsider- und Effizienzlohntheorie, ist jedoch im 
Widerspruch zu Fairnessüberlegungen, denen zufolge Lohnreduktionen so eingesetzt werden, 
dass die Lohndispersion innerhalb von Peergruppen sinkt. Unsere Schlussfolgerung ist somit, 
dass Reallohnreduktionen, obwohl sie im Allgemeinen selten anzutreffen sind, spezifisch die 
Beschäftigtengruppen treffen, die nicht so wichtig für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der 
Unternehmen sind.  
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Abstract: Using linked employer–employee panel data for Germany, this paper investigates 
whether firms implement real wage reductions in a selective manner. In line with insider–
outsider and several strands of efficiency wage theory, we find strong evidence for selective 
wage cuts with high-productivity workers being spared even when controlling for permanent 
differences in firms’ wage policies. In contrast to some recent contributions stressing fairness 
considerations, we also find that wage cuts increase wage dispersion among peers rather than 
narrowing it. Notably, the same selectivity pattern shows up when restricting our analysis to 
firms covered by collective agreements or having a works council. 
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1   Introduction 
There is overwhelming evidence that workers face a low risk of being hit by wage reductions 
(e.g. Kahn, 1997; Dickens et al., 2007; Babecký et al., 2010). For instance, Dustmann and 
Schönberg (2009) report that in Germany during the period 1996–1999 less than ten per cent 
of young workers working full-time hours experienced an annual decrease in real wages of 
five per cent or more. Theoretically, firms’ reluctance to reduce real wages is typically 
explained in terms of implicit contract theory with employers insuring workers against real 
income losses (e.g. Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975), efficiency wage theory with firms shying 
away from the adverse consequences of wage cuts on worker effort, turnover, and quality 
(e.g. Yellen, 1984), and insider–outsider theory with insiders possessing considerable 
bargaining power to obviate wage reductions (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower, 1988).
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Whereas numerous empirical studies document that these theories are likely to 
contribute to the low incidence of real wage cuts (e.g. Campbell and Kamlani, 1997; Bewley, 
1999; Franz and Pfeiffer, 2006; Agell and Bennmarker, 2007; Babecký et al., 2010), existing 
studies – with the notable exception of Böckerman et al. (2007) – do not investigate 
differences in workers’ individual risk of being exposed to real wage reductions, and to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on which groups of workers are disproportionally 
hit by wage reductions. Yet, we should expect to find such differences given our theoretical 
priors. Just to give an example, consider Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) shirking model. In this 
model, wage cuts increase the likelihood that workers shirk and thus adversely affect 
productivity, and we are left with a reason why wage cuts should be rare. However, this line 
                                                 
1
  In our analysis, we will follow Dustmann and Schönberg (2009) and define a real wage cut as a reduction in 
the real wage of five per cent or more relative to the previous year thereby ensuring that the wage cut is 
substantial enough to be felt by workers. As in our period of observation, inflation was well below five per 
cent, a real wage reduction coincides with a nominal wage reduction, and our analysis is also informative on 
the selectivity of nominal wage reductions. Yet our theoretical arguments for selective wage reductions are 
concerned with real rather than nominal, so we will restrict attention to real wage reductions in the following. 
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of argument applies to different groups of workers to a different extent. As a case in point, 
more skilled workers are likely to perform tasks that are more difficult to monitor than those 
performed by workers with low skills. Because of less effective monitoring preventing the 
more skilled workers from shirking, firms may rely to a greater extent on efficiency wage 
considerations for this group of workers. As a consequence, we expect higher skilled workers 
to face a lower risk of a real wage cut. That said, efficiency wage models based on fairness 
considerations and related evidence suggest selective wage reductions may be deemed unfair 
by workers, so that firms may be reluctant to implement selective wage cuts.  
It is thus an open question ex ante whether firms actually resort to selective wage cuts 
– the point at the heart of this paper’s contribution to the literature. While most of the extant 
evidence comes from employer surveys and lab experiments, we are able to use linked 
employer–employee data for Germany that allow us to analyse workers’ individual risk of 
experiencing a real wage cut and whether some employee groups are disproportionally hit by 
wage reductions. In a first step, we investigate which individual and employer characteristics 
affect the probability that a worker faces a real wage reduction, restricting our sample to the 
homogenous group of young employees starting their first job. In a next step, we include firm 
fixed effects to our model to control for permanent differences in firms’ wage policies. 
Finally, we add workers’ wage residual estimated from an extended Mincerian wage 
regression for the previous year including a broad range of individual characteristics as well 
as firm fixed effects. Including the wage residual allows us to test whether employers spare 
high-performance workers from real wage cuts to prevent them from lowering their effort or 
leaving the firm, or rather cut wages in such a way reducing the wage dispersion among peers 
to promote fairness. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we summarise the 
theoretical and empirical literature on real wage reductions and derive our hypotheses which 
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determinants are likely to affect workers’ individual probability of facing a real wage 
reduction. Section 3 describes our data and Section 4 our econometric approach. Section 5 
presents and discusses our results, and Section 6 concludes. 
2   Existing Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1   Efficiency Wage Theory 
As stressed in the introduction, real wage cuts are rarely observed in real-world labour 
markets with efficiency wage, insider–outsider, and implicit contract theory providing 
explanations for this finding. According to efficiency wage theory, firms gain from paying 
wages above the market-clearing level, and wage reductions would thus put these gains at 
stake. Paying higher-than-necessary wages is expected to (i) reduce worker shirking (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984), (ii) depress turnover thereby lowering hiring and training costs (Stiglitz, 
1974), (iii) improve the average quality of job applicants (Weiss, 1980), and (iv) increase 
workers’ effort due to social norms and fairness standards (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1990). Existing evidence from employer surveys suggests that efficiency wage 
considerations indeed play an important role in explaining the low incidence of wage 
reductions (Campbell and Kamlani, 1997; Franz and Pfeiffer, 2006; Agell and Bennmarker, 
2007; Babecký et al., 2010). Moreover, efficiency wage theories give rise to clear predictions 
on selective wage reductions. Shirking, labour turnover, and adverse selection models 
obviously provide rationales for selective wage reductions, as we shall detail below, whereas 
fairness considerations may leave firms to resort to selective wage reductions to a much lesser 
extent.  
In Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) shirking model, paying wages above the market-
clearing level results in equilibrium unemployment that prevents workers from shirking 
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because the queues of job applicants render a job loss costly to them. As a consequence, the 
increase in labour cost is compensated for by a rise in worker productivity, and firms are 
expected to be reluctant to cut wages lest to spoil this positive productivity effect. These 
considerations also make clear why we should expect to find selective wage reductions. In 
general, firms should spare high-productivity workers such as high-skilled workers from wage 
cuts as shirking of these individuals is likely to greatly influence firms’ profits. In a similar 
vein, firms should also spare workers with a high wage residual (given important observable 
characteristics that explain differences in productivity), which we will consider as a measure 
of individuals’ unobserved performance in the firm (details are given in Sections 4 and 5 
where we discuss our econometric approach and results). We also expect firms to be more 
reluctant to cut wages for workers whose output is more difficult to monitor like high-skilled 
or high-productivity workers, who are more likely to perform non-standard tasks (Babecký et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, monitoring is likely to be more costly in large firms (Oi and Idson, 
1999) that may therefore refrain to a greater extent from wage cuts. What is more, for firms 
operating in East Germany, which still shows a much poorer labour market performance than 
West Germany, wage cuts are likely to be less harmful.  
Other than the shirking model, in Stiglitz’ (1974) labour turnover model, efficiency 
wages are paid to decrease worker turnover resulting in savings on hiring and training costs. 
These savings compensate for the increase in labour cost.
2
 Furthermore, efficiency wages 
raise the average unobserved quality of the pool of firms’ job applicants in Weiss’ (1980) 
adverse selection model. Since turnover is particularly costly in case of high-productivity 
workers and these workers also have the highest propensity to quit in response to wage 
reductions in the adverse selection model, the labour turnover and the adverse selection model 
point at the same individual determinants of individual wage cuts as the shirking model. 
                                                 
2
 In line with this, Cornelißen and Hübler (2008) find for Germany that downward wage rigidity has a 
significantly negative impact on worker turnover. 
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Another remarkable point was made by Howitt (2002): wage reductions should be less 
prevalent if labour costs are just a small part of total costs because in this case negative effects 
on productivity are likely to dominate positive labour cost effects on profits. Extending this 
argument to different subgroups of workers, we expect that an individual’s probability of 
being hit by a real wage cut is larger if the share of workers with the same individual 
characteristics in the firm’s workforce is higher, as a larger share of similar workers in the 
workforce causes selective wage cuts for this group of workers to have a bigger impact on the 
firm’s labour costs. Alluding to the well-known fourth Hicks–Marshall rule of derived labour 
demand, we will refer to the hypothesis that selective wage cuts are more likely for groups of 
workers representing a large part of the firm’s workforce as the “importance of being 
unimportant”. 
2.2   Insider–Outsider Theory 
On top of efficiency wage theory, insider–outsider theory stresses that insiders possess 
bargaining power in the wage-setting process (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988), which they may 
well be able to use to prevent firms from implementing wage reductions. Obviously, different 
groups of workers may differ in their bargaining power. As a case in point, workers 
possessing high levels of specific human capital, i.e. more tenured workers, may be exempted 
from wage reductions (Holden, 1994; Malcomson, 1997). Implicit seniority wage contracts 
may be in place with high-tenured workers earning more than their actual productivity, 
however. As these workers may thus lack outside options offering comparable earnings, firms 
may be less reluctant to cut wages for high-tenure workers. This argument is also in line with 
the finding by Blinder and Choi (1990) that firms tend to cut wages for workers earning 
above-productivity wages. 
Insiders’ bargaining power is also likely to be influenced by several firm 
characteristics such as the industrial relations regime or the profit situation. In Germany, 
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industrial relations are characterised by a dual system of worker representation through trade 
unions and works councils (for details, see Addison et al., 2010). In firms covered by 
collective agreements or having a works council, insiders should possess more bargaining 
power enabling them to prevent wage cuts to a greater extent. Moreover, these institutions 
may also foster implicit contracts, which are another reason given for the low incidence of 
real wage reductions. In particular, collective agreements at sector level are likely to prevent 
wage reductions, whereas this may hold to a lesser extent for collective agreements at firm 
level (Gürtzgen, 2009). Gartner et al. (2013) stress, however, that the existence of works 
councils or unions may also cause workers to regard real wage cuts as fair. For example, 
works councils may be able to credibly convince workers that wage moderation is necessary 
to increase competitiveness. Furthermore, in firms bound by collective agreements, wage cuts 
may not be perceived as unilaterally imposed by management. Finally, firms with a good 
profit situation can be expected to shy away from wage cuts and to share rents with their 
employees instead (Arai, 2003; Gützgen, 2009). 
2.3   Fairness Considerations 
Other than the efficiency wage and insider–outsider theories discussed so far, fairness 
considerations and the related empirical literature arrive at conclusions less favourable for 
selective real wage cuts. According to fairness models, firms abstain from reducing wages 
because workers are likely to lower effort due to reciprocity. As wage cuts are usually 
perceived as damaging by management, the empirical evidence on the reciprocity effects of 
wage reductions mainly relies on interview and survey studies. Two rare exemptions are the 
field experiments in Cohn et al. (2011) and Kube et al. (2011). In a natural field experiment, 
Kube et al. (2011) find that workers who had been hired at a certain wage showed 





 Furthermore, in a randomised field experiment, Cohn et al. (2011) observe teams 
of two salesmen in a temporary promotion campaign. Whereas a general wage cut to both 
team members is found to significantly decrease the team’s overall performance, a selective 
wage reduction has even worse consequences: reducing the wage for just one team member 
triggers a drop in this team member’s performance that is more than twice the size of the 
overall drop in performance from a general wage reduction. Consequently, firms should 
generally avoid selective wage cuts.  
That said, fairness considerations also stress that newly hired workers who lack a long 
history of interactions with the management and an established position in the firm are likely 
to possess looser fairness standards than more senior workers; they should thus accept a wage 
cut more easily (Fehr and Götte, 2005). Finally, from interviews with managers Blinder and 
Choi (1990) document that firms tend to reduce wages for workers who earn more than 
comparable workers for fairness standards. We should therefore expect firms to implement 
selective wage cuts among observationally similar workers, such as for those with positive 
wage residuals, in order to reduce wage dispersion among peers. 
2.4   Summary of Hypotheses 
All in all, we therefore arrive at the following characteristics likely to influence individuals’ 
probability of being hit by a real wage reduction, provided that firms implement selective 
wage cuts: individual characteristics likely to matter are skills, tenure, and the wage residual. 
Whereas high-skilled individuals are expected to face a lower risk of a real wage cut, the 
effects of the wage residual and tenure could be either positive or negative. In particular, the 
effect of the wage residual allows us to test whether individuals with high unobserved 
                                                 
3
  There are also some case studies on the effect of wage reductions on effort. For instance, Lee and Rupp 
(2007) find only a small and short-lived negative impact on effort following large and permanent pay cuts for 
commercial airline pilots in the US. They argue that this surprising result may be driven by this employee 
group’s poor outside options during their period of observation and high absolute remuneration levels even 
after the pay cuts. 
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performance are exempted from wage reductions or whether they face a higher risk of wage 
cuts, as these are used to reduce the wage dispersion among peers due to fairness 
considerations. To investigate which groups of workers are disproportionally hit by wage 
reductions, the share of workers with a real wage reduction and interactions of this share with 
individual characteristics are added. Next, interactions of individual characteristics and the 
share of individuals with the very same characteristics in the workforce are included to see 
whether the selectivity of wage cuts is larger for groups of workers forming a large part of the 
firm’s workforce, i.e. whether it is indeed important to be unimportant. Finally, plant 
characteristics likely to matter are those capturing the industrial relations regime, the profit 
situation, and firm size. 
2.5   Existing Evidence and Contribution to the Literature 
Most empirical evidence on selective wage cuts comes from studies that investigate the 
factors driving downward wage rigidities within a sector or firm. In line with expectations, 
these studies document that workforce composition, such as the shares of workers of different 
qualification, age, sex etc., and wage-setting institutions affect the extent of downward wage 
rigidity (e.g., Franz and Pfeiffer, 2006; Agell and Bennmarker, 2007; Babecký et al., 2010; 
Du Caju et al., 2012). As a case in point, in most studies the share of qualified workers 
increases downward rigidities. However, this sort of evidence on selective wage cuts just 
follows from an indirect route. To the best of our knowledge, the only study investigating the 
impact of individual and firm characteristics on workers’ individual probability of 
experiencing a real wage cut is Böckerman et al. (2007) for Finland. They find that several 
individual and firm characteristics, such as age, experience or tenure, qualification, firm size, 
and firm profits, impact the incidence of real wage cuts.  
In the following, we try to improve on the existing evidence in several ways: 
Analogously to Böckerman et al. (2007), we investigate the impact of worker and firm 
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characteristics on workers’ probability of experiencing a real wage reduction. Our large data 
set for Germany allows us to base our investigation on a homogenous sample of young 
workers starting their first job. This sample reduction allows us to eliminate unobserved 
heterogeneity between workers with respect to labour market histories and entry conditions 
that may be related to the risk of being hit by real wage reduction. Since we use linked 
employer–employee data comprising almost all workers of a sample of firms who are covered 
by the social security system, we are also able to control for permanent firm differences in pay 
policies by including firm fixed effects. Furthermore, we are able to investigate which groups 
of firms’ workers are disproportionally hit by wage cuts. As our data include detailed 
information on firms’ workforce composition, we can also test the “importance of being 
unimportant” hypothesis, i.e. whether groups of workers with certain characteristics who 
represent a small block of firms’ employment and labour costs are less frequent subject to 
wage reductions. Finally, we add workers’ wage residual estimated from a Mincerian wage 
regression including several worker characteristics and firm fixed effects. This allows us to 
test whether firms selectively reduce wages in order to lower wage dispersion among similar 
workers as suggested by fairness considerations, or whether they exempt high-performers 
from wage cuts to prevent them from reducing effort or leaving the firm.  
3   Data 
To investigate individual differences in the exposure to real wage cuts, this paper uses seven 
waves of the German linked employer–employee data set of the Institute for Employment 
Research, the LIAB cross-sectional model, comprising the years 2000–2006. The LIAB 
combines a yearly survey of the same plants (not companies) with administrative data coming 
from the notification procedure of the German social insurance system (for details on the data, 
see Alda et al., 2005, or Jacobebbinghaus and Alda, 2007). While the plant survey includes 
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information on plant size, sector, industrial relations, profitability, and workforce 
composition, the administrative data contains information on workers’ gross daily real wage 
(deflated by the consumer price index), age, sex, nationality, schooling, and professional 
education at the 30th of June of each year. On average, more than 90 per cent of the workers 
in each plant who are covered by the social security system can be identified in the data. Due 
to the panel structure of the data set and the richness of the information contained, it is 
possible to both observe workers’ professional career and their wage development as well as 
the characteristics of workers and their employers rendering the LIAB especially suitable for 
our purpose. 
That said, we should make clear that our data set has three limitations important to our 
analysis. First, the start of employment relationships is left-censored at 1st January 1975 for 
workers in West Germany and 1st January 1992 for workers in East Germany because the 
notification procedure of the social security system that produces our individual data was not 
in place before these dates in the respective part of Germany. Second, wages are top-coded at 
the social security contribution ceiling. As a consequence, we do not know the true wage of 
on average 4.6 per cent of workers. In both cases, crucial information is missing and we 
cannot use these individuals in our analysis. In addition, workers with a different labour 
market history are likely to show differences in their characteristics that are unobservable in 
our data, such as the attendance to certified training courses, certificates from previous 
employers, or different labour market entry conditions due to business cycle effects. To deal 
with these three limitations, our sample just comprises workers within their first five years in 
their first jobs. In our sample, censored wage, tenure, or experience information poses no 
problems. What is more, for workers in our sample experience equals tenure, so that after 
controlling for years all workers have the same initial conditions such as the state of the 
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business cycle when starting their employment careers (Flinn, 1986).
4
 The latter point is 
important because in Germany, as in other countries, entry wages have been found to 
considerably react to business cycle changes (Stüber, 2013). 
A third limitation of our data set is that we observe daily gross wages rather than 
hourly wage rates and detailed information on working hours is missing. We just observe a 
qualitative measure distinguishing full-time and two sorts of part-time employment. For this 
reason, we restrict our analysis to individuals working full-time hours, for whom daily gross 
wages are comparable. For the interpretation of our following results, it is thus important to 
bear in mind that cuts in real daily wages may occur due to a fall in the wage rate or due to 
reduced working hours. We argue, though, that this should not render our insights 
uninformative, as from a worker’s point of view it is total real income that matters most, 
rather than the real hourly wage rate. 
4   Econometric Approach 
In a first step, we analyse the incidence of a real wage reduction of five per cent or more 
relative to the previous year for those workers who stay with the same plant using a linear 
probability model.
5
 As individual covariates, we include (i) individual characteristics, (ii) 
interactions of these characteristics with the share of the plant’s workers experiencing a real 
wage cut, and (iii) interactions of these characteristics with the share of other workers of the 
same characteristics in the plant’s workforce. The inclusion of interactions of individual 
                                                 
4
 As apprentices usually experience automatic yearly wage increases during their apprenticeship period, we 
exclude workers during their apprenticeship and consider those in their first skilled employment instead. 
Therefore, the equality of workers’ experience and tenure only holds if we do not regard a previous 
apprenticeship as tenure. 
5
  Note that fitting probit models (without plant fixed effects) rather than linear probability models yields very 
similar results. The same holds when estimating complementary log–log models, which take into account that 
a real wage cut by five per cent or more is a quite rare event. Yet, estimating these non-linear binary response 
models does not allow us to include plant fixed effects in further analyses due to the incidental parameter 
problem, so that we stick to linear models in the following. 
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characteristics and the share of workers with a real wage cut allows us to investigate whether 
groups of workers with certain characteristics are disproportionally subject to wage reductions 
if the number of those affected increases. Moreover, adding interactions of individual 
characteristics with the share of other workers of the same characteristics enables us to 
analyse whether groups of workers forming a small block of the plant’s employment and 
labour costs are less often subject to wage cuts, i.e. the “importance of being unimportant” 
hypothesis. Note that all interaction terms (the shares of workers with certain characteristics 
and of workers hit by a wage reduction) are centred around their sample means. Hence, the 
slope coefficient for a certain characteristic can be interpreted as the partial effect for the 
average worker. 
Following our theoretical considerations in Section 2, individual characteristics 
included are groups of education and tenure dummies.
6
 We further add a sex dummy and a 
dummy for German nationality as controls. Plant characteristics included are the shares of 
workers with the very same characteristics in the plant’s workforce, the share of workers with 
a real wage reduction, the share of workers in their first jobs, a group of dummy variables 
capturing the plant’s industrial relation regime (i.e. the existence of collective agreements 
either at sector or at firm level as well as works council existence), the percentage change in 
the plant’s employment, a dummy for a good profit situation, a dummy indicating that 
management expects future employment decreases, groups of plant size as well as sector 
dummies, and a dummy for location in Eastern Germany. For descriptive statistics of key 
variables, see Table 1. 
In a second step, we add plant fixed effects to our model and drop those plant 
                                                 
6
  We distinguish workers with three levels of education: low-skilled, medium-skilled (i.e. with an occupational 
degree), and high-skilled (i.e. with an academic degree) workers. Note again that in our sample of young 
workers in their first jobs tenure equals experience. Note further that we control for education and tenure 
years for young employees in their first job. Therefore, age dummies are highly correlated with the other 
covariates and we do not include them as regressors. 
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covariates that are (almost) time-invariant such as sector dummies or the variables capturing 
the plant’s industrial relations regime. Doing so rinses out permanent differences in plants’ 
wage policies that may not be fully captured by our plant covariates and thus bases our 
insights on a firmer footing. 
In a final step, we add workers’ wage residual estimated from an extended Mincerian 
wage regression for the previous year that includes several individual characteristics and a 
plant fixed effect as regressors to our wage reduction model.
7
 The idea for this extension is 
that the wage residual can serve as a measure of individual performance or a specific value of 
the worker to the plant, both of which are unobservable for the researcher and result in a 
higher wage for this worker compared to his or her peer group of workers with the same 
observed characteristics. Since a plant fixed effect is included in the wage equation used to 
estimate the wage residual, it captures individual wage differences caused by unobserved 
individual characteristics given the plant’s wage policy. The inclusion of the wage residual 
thus allows us to test whether employers exempt high-performance workers, i.e. those with a 
high wage residual, from wage cuts to prevent them from reducing their effort or leaving the 
plant as predicted by several strands of efficiency wage theory, or rather implement wage cuts 
in such a way that wage dispersion among peers is reduced as suggested by fairness 
considerations. 
5   Results 
5.1   Determinants of a Real Wage Reduction 
As discussed in the previous section, Table 2 shows the results from fitting linear models for 
individuals’ probability of being hit by a real wage reduction of 5 per cent or more comprising 
                                                 
7
  Further details on the specification of the wage equation are given in Section 5. 
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several worker and plant characteristics (Model 1), plant fixed effects (Model 2), and the 
wage residual estimated from an extended Mincerian wage regression (Model 3). As can be 
seen from Model 1 in Table 2, we find strong evidence of selective real wage cuts. In line 
with earlier findings, medium-skilled (high-skilled) workers have a 3.0 (1.6) percentage 
points lower probability of being hit by a real wage reduction than low-skilled workers (with 
the difference of the two effects not being statistically significant at the 10 per cent level). 
Whereas the effect for high-skilled workers is only statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
level, both effects are significant from an economic point of view, as only 13 per cent of 
workers experience real wage cuts in our sample of job starters (see Table 1). Furthermore, 
German and female workers are less often hit by real wage reductions. In addition, the risk of 
being subject to a wage reduction is significantly lower for workers with low tenure.
8
 Yet 
interestingly, plants with a high share of low-tenure workers (two or less years of tenure) 
more often (have to) resort to real wage cuts. One reading of this finding is that plants that 
recently have expanded their workforce avoid firing these new hires when being forced to 
reduce their labour costs and cut wages instead – with the burden of wage reductions being 
shouldered by all of the plants’ employees rather than by the newly hired exclusively. 
Unsurprisingly, we also find that the share of the plant’s workers affected by a real 
wage reduction increases the individual probability of a wage cut. As can be seen from the 
coefficient of the share of workers with a real wage reduction, the partial effect for the 
reference group of non-German, male, and low-skilled workers with two years of tenure is 
clearly below unity, so that this group is less than proportionally hit by wage reductions. 
Adding the interaction effects of the share of those affected and the respective individual 
                                                 
8
  One may wonder whether the positive impact of tenure on the risk of a real wage cut is the result of just 
considering workers with at most five years of tenure and reverses for more tenured workers. As a check of 
robustness we therefore redo our analysis for the larger sample of workers with at most ten years of tenure 
(again in their first job). As can be seen from Table A.2, which reports the coefficients for the tenure 
dummies only because those of other regressors are almost the same, this does not change our results. 
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characteristics, we see that non-German, male, and low-skilled workers with three or four 
years of tenure are nearly proportionally hit by real wage reductions, whereas those with five 
years of tenure are more than proportionally subject to wage cuts. Given the large positive 
interaction effect for high-skilled workers, all subgroups of workers with an academic degree 
are less than proportionally hit by wage reductions. As a consequence, real wage cuts seem to 
be highly selective with workers’ skills and tenure being two crucial dimensions. 
There is only slight evidence in line with the “importance of being unimportant” 
hypothesis stating that employers are more prone to selectively reduce wages for groups of 
workers who form a large fraction of the plant’s workforce, as this arguably has a big impact 
on overall labour costs. We find that the share of workers with a certain characteristic in the 
firm’s workforce, say three years of tenure, increases the individual risk of workers with the 
very same characteristic, viz. three years of tenure, to experience a wage reduction.
9
 Yet, 
these positive effects are generally not statistically significant, with some few exceptions such 
as medium-skilled workers or those with three years of tenure, and of modest size. 
Turning to plant characteristics, we find that working for a plant covered by a 
collective agreement at sector level significantly decreases the likelihood of facing a real 
wage reduction, whereas neither the profit situation nor managers’ expectations about future 
employment changes have a significant impact. What is more, small plants resort to wage cuts 
more often than large plants as do Eastern German compared to Western German plants, 
which is clearly in line with our expectations.
10
  
Adding plant fixed effects to the model does not change the picture (see Model 2 in 
Table 2). Our findings are thus not driven by unobserved differences in plants’ time-invariant 
wage policies. In particular, all coefficients of individual characteristics are of similar 
                                                 
9
  A positive interaction effect between the incidence of real wage cuts for females and their share in the 
workforce is also found by Böckerman et al. (2007) in some of their models. 
10
  Note that running separate regressions for workers employed by Western and Eastern German plants does not 
change our insights. 
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magnitude as before, so that we are still left with strong evidence of highly selective wage 
cuts. 
5.2   Including Workers’ Wage Residual 
Further including the wage residual estimated from an extended Mincerian wage regression 
for the previous year provides additional insights (see Model 3 in Table 2). As regressors to 
the wage equation we include a group of education dummies, a sex dummy, a dummy for 
German nationality, age (linearly and quadratic), tenure (linearly and quadratic), a group of 
dummy variables capturing the tenure in the previous job, a dummy variable indicating 
whether this job is the individual’s first one, and a plant fixed effect. Table A1 in the appendix 
exemplarily reports the estimates for the year 2000. The very same model has been estimated 
for the years 2001–2006 with estimated coefficients being very similar to those reported for 
the year 2000. Note that in these regressions observations for all full-time employed workers 
are included in order to consider plants’ entire workforce, with top-coded wages being 
multiply imputed according to the method proposed by Addison et al. (2010).
11
  
While including the wage residual to the model does not change much for the other 
variables included, we find that workers with a higher wage residual face a significantly lower 
probability of a real wage cut. Earning 10 per cent more than one’s peers (i.e. other workers in 
the same plant with the very same individual characteristics) decreases the probability of a 
real wage cut by about 2.8 per cent on average.
12
 In the light of our discussion in Section 2, 
we interpret this finding as an indication that plants selectively spare high-performance 
                                                 
11
  Our results remain virtually unchanged when estimating individuals’ wage residuals from (i) a joint wage 
regression for all years, (ii) yearly wage regressions excluding plant fixed effects, or (iii) yearly wage 
regressions excluding individuals with top-coded wages. 
12
  As the wage residual is estimated from a wage equation for the previous year, one might argue that a positive 
wage residual just reflects above-average working hours, say, because of working overtime in that year, and 
therefore is likely to be reversed in the current year. Clearly, this would cause the residual to have a positive 
impact on the wage reduction probability rather than a negative which is found here. While we cannot rule 
out that the wage residual indeed reflects such working hours fluctuations, the positive impact found would 




workers from real wage cuts, thereby avoiding increased turnover and/or decreased effort of 
this crucial group of workers. Whereas this finding is in line with theoretical considerations 
relying on non-fairness efficiency wage and insider–outsider models, it is clearly at odds with 




5.3   Heterogeneities by Industrial Relations 
Up to now, we have controlled for industrial relations either by a group of industrial relations 
dummies or a plant fixed effect and thereby have restricted the individual and plant 
characteristics to show the same impact on individuals’ probability of being hit by a real wage 
reduction in plants with different industrial relations regimes. Yet, the existence of collective 
agreements or works councils may affect employers’ ability to engage in selective wage cuts. 
The subgroups of workers employed by plants bound by collective agreements or having a 
works council may therefore show different selectivity patterns in wage cuts than those found 
when pooling all plants. To check this, we repeat our analysis for workers employed by three 
subgroups of plants: (i) plants covered by a collective agreement at sector level, (ii) plants 
bound by an agreement at firm level, and (iii) plants with a works council. As can be seen 
from Table 3, which reports linear models for the individual wage reduction probability of 
these three groups of workers (analogous to Model 3 in Table 2), our findings for all firms 
also hold in these three subgroups, with only little differences across groups.
14
All in all, we 
thus find clear and robust evidence that employers make use of selective real wage cuts.
15
  
                                                 
13
  We also checked whether the effect of the wage residual is symmetric or differs for positive and negative 
residuals. We found a somewhat weaker effect for positive than for negative residuals. This did not change 
our results, however. 
14
  In further regressions, we also redid this analysis for even finer subgroups of plants such as plants with both a 
works council and a collective agreement at sector level. This did not change our findings. 
15
  Obviously, (selective) wage cuts are only one alternative for employers to decrease labour costs. Another 
alternative is to rely on (selective) layoffs. To see whether plants resort to selective layoffs and which groups 
of workers are more likely to be laid off, we estimated a linear model for the individual probability of job 




6   Conclusions 
In this paper, we have investigated whether employers who (have to) reduce real wages do so 
in a selective manner. Using German linked employer–employee panel data for the 
homogenous group of young workers in the first five years of their first job, we fitted linear 
models for individuals’ probability of experiencing a real wage cut including plant fixed 
effects that control for permanent differences in plants’ wage policies. We find clear evidence 
that firms resort to selective wage reductions, which is in line with insider–outsider and 
several branches of efficiency wage theory, but in contrast to some recent contributions 
discarding selective wage reductions and stressing fairness considerations instead.  
Medium-skilled and high-skilled workers are less likely to face a real wage reduction 
than low-skilled workers. Especially high-skilled workers are less than proportionally hit by 
wage cuts. The same holds for workers who have just recently been hired. We find almost no 
evidence for what we termed the “importance of being unimportant” hypothesis. That is, 
workers’ individual risk of a real wage reduction seems not to be higher if the share of 
workers with the same individual characteristics is higher in the workforce, so that wage 
reductions for this very group are likely to have a big impact on the employer’s total labour 
costs. Adding workers’ wage residual estimated from an extended Mincerian wage regression 
for the previous year as a measure of unobserved worker performance, we further find that 
workers with a higher residual have a significantly lower incidence of real wage cuts. Our 
finding is clearly in line with bargaining and several branches of efficiency wage theory, it is 
at odds, however, with fairness considerations pressing employers to selectively reduce wages 
                                                 
analogous impact as in the wage reduction equation such as workers’ wage residual, skills, and nationality, 
thereby further substantiating our findings, whereas covariates such as tenure and sex point in the opposite 
direction. These findings might be a first indication that some employee groups such as higher educated 
employees and employees with unobservable positive characteristics are strongly shielded against negative 
shocks both in terms of wage and employment stability. Other workers such as females or employees in their 
first and second year of employment have a lower risk to suffer wage reductions. However, this comes at the 
cost of a higher employment termination risk. 
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such that wage dispersion among peers is reduced. We thus conclude that real wage 
reductions, though rare in general, are specifically aimed at those groups of workers who are 
less crucial to firm performance.  
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Table 1:  Selected descriptive statistics (means) 
 
Full sample Sample of young 
workers in first job 
Share of workers with real wage reduction 0.134 0.131 
Low-skilled (no occupational degree) 0.131 0.235 
Medium-skilled (occupational degree) 0.684 0.521 
High-skilled (academic degree)  0.136  0.254 
Female 0.267 0.394 
German  0.923 0.806 
Share of workers with tenure no more than 5 years 0.348 1.000 
Share of workers in first job 0.197 1.000 
Log wage 4.573 4.230 
Yearly change in log real wages 0.027 0.023 
Relative employment change  0.007 0.009 
Expected employment reduction 0.373 0.354 
Works council 0.866 0.818 
Collective bargaining at sector level 0.722 0.694 
Collective bargaining at firm level 0.137 0.114 
Good profit situation 0.199 0.277 
Plant size 1–20 0.028 0.036 
Plant size 21–200 0.195 0.203 
Plant size 201–500 0.186 0.186 
Plant size 501–2000 0.294 0.310 
Plant size larger than 2000 0.297 0.255 
East Germany 0.178 0.169 
 




Table 2:  Individual probability of facing a real wage reduction 
Regressand: dummy for real wage reduction Model 1: OLS Model 2: plant FE Model 3: plant FE 
Regressors: Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Wage residual in previous year       -0.277 ** (0.011) 
Medium-skilled (occupational degree) -0.030 ** (0.005) -0.031 ** (0.005) -0.048 ** (0.005) 
High-skilled (academic degree)  -0.016 (0.008) -0.018 * (0.008) -0.042 ** (0.009) 
Female  -0.024 ** (0.004) -0.023 ** (0.004) -0.012 ** (0.004) 
German  -0.054 ** (0.006) -0.056 ** (0.006) -0.078 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 3 years 0.051 ** (0.005) 0.054 ** (0.005) 0.061 ** (0.005) 
Tenure 4 years 0.122 ** (0.005) 0.125 ** (0.005) 0.135 ** (0.005) 
Tenure 5 years 0.132 ** (0.006) 0.135 ** (0.006) 0.145 ** (0.006) 
Share of workers with real wage reduction 0.802 ** (0.024) 0.753 ** (0.027) 0.747 ** (0.027) 
Relative employment change  -0.014 * (0.007) -0.003  (0.007) -0.004  (0.007) 
Share of medium-skilled workers -0.032 (0.018) 0.021  (0.061) 0.008  (0.062) 
Share of high-skilled workers -0.114 ** (0.027) -0.102  (0.109) -0.092  (0.108) 
Share of female workers 0.010 (0.017) 0.120  (0.083) 0.146  (0.082) 
Share of German workers 0.039 (0.031) 0.105  (0.110) 0.086  (0.109) 
Share of workers with 1 year tenure 0.147 ** (0.021) 0.063  (0.043) 0.100 * (0.043) 
Share of workers with 2 years tenure 0.161 ** (0.029) 0.076  (0.045) 0.089  (0.046) 
Share of workers with 3 years tenure 0.045 (0.027) -0.010  (0.035) -0.007  (0.036) 
Share of workers with 4 years tenure -0.013 (0.026) -0.022  (0.025) -0.021  (0.028) 
Share of workers with 5 years tenure 0.024 (0.024) 0.029  (0.024) 0.032  (0.025) 
Share of workers with first job 0.016 (0.015) 0.074  (0.081) 0.061  (0.078) 
Works council -0.004 (0.006)       
Collective bargaining at sector level -0.024 ** (0.006)       
Collective bargaining at firm level -0.002 (0.012)       
Expected employment decrease 0.037 (0.056) 0.197 * (0.094) 0.219 ** (0.083) 
Good profit situation -0.008 (0.005) -0.009  (0.006) -0.008  (0.006) 
Plant size 1–20 0.033 ** (0.010) -0.008  (0.036) -0.012  (0.036) 
Plant size 21–200 0.014 ** (0.005) 0.006  (0.017) 0.000  (0.017) 
Plant size 501–2000 0.006 (0.006) -0.027  (0.016) -0.027  (0.016) 
Plant size larger than 2000 -0.011 (0.009) -0.048  (0.029) -0.060 * (0.027) 
East Germany 0.027 ** (0.006)       
Medium-skilled * share medium-skilled 0.087 ** (0.030) 0.067  (0.036) 0.059  (0.038) 
High-skilled * share high-skilled 0.074 * (0.037) 0.039  (0.042) -0.000  (0.043) 
Female * share females 0.065 ** (0.017) 0.049 ** (0.017) 0.033 * (0.017) 
German * share Germans -0.108 ** (0.035) -0.110 ** (0.039) -0.131 ** (0.045) 
Tenure 3 years * share tenure 3 years 0.068 (0.036) 0.045  (0.042) 0.029  (0.040) 
Tenure 4 years * share tenure 4 years 0.049 (0.039) 0.054  (0.042) 0.040  (0.047) 
Tenure 5 years * share tenure 5 years 0.022 (0.037) 0.022  (0.041) 0.007  (0.041) 
Wage residual * share real wage reduction      -0.018   (0.050) 
Medium-skilled * share real wage reduction -0.074 ** (0.019) -0.069 ** (0.022) -0.062 ** (0.021) 
High-skilled * share wage reduction -0.216 ** (0.031) -0.183 ** (0.035) -0.178 ** (0.036) 
Female * share wage reduction -0.047 ** (0.016) -0.057 ** (0.018) -0.059 ** (0.018) 
German * share wage reduction -0.061 * (0.024) -0.063 * (0.028) -0.062 * (0.027) 
Tenure 3 years * share real wage reduction 0.132 ** (0.020) 0.141 ** (0.022) 0.138 ** (0.021) 
Tenure 4 years * share real wage reduction 0.266 ** (0.020) 0.298 ** (0.022) 0.298 ** (0.022) 
Tenure 5 years * share real wage reduction 0.299 ** (0.021) 0.331 ** (0.023) 0.324 ** (0.023) 




 (overall): 0.152 R
2
 (overall): 0.161 
Notes: The data set used is the LIAB cross-sectional model, waves 2000–2006. Only workers in their first job and with at 
most 5 years tenure are included. **/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5 per cent level, where robust standard errors 
are clustered at the plant level. Reference group: low-skilled worker with 2 years of tenure working for a plant with 201–500 
employees with neither a works council nor a collective agreement; further regressors included are 16 sector and 6 year 
dummies and a constant. In all interaction terms, the shares of workers with certain characteristics and of workers hit by a 




Table 3:  Individual probability of facing a real wage reduction by industrial relations 
Regressand: dummy for real wage reduction Collective agree-
ment at sector level  
Collective agree-
ment at firm level 
Works council 
Regressors: Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Wage residual in previous year -0.255 ** (0.013) -0.325 ** (0.030) -0.261 ** (0.012) 
Medium-skilled (occupational degree) -0.054 ** (0.007) -0.027  (0.015) -0.050 ** (0.006) 
High-skilled (academic degree)  -0.039 ** (0.011) -0.073 ** (0.019) -0.040 ** (0.010) 
Female  -0.014 ** (0.005) -0.013  (0.011) -0.015 ** (0.005) 
German  -0.081 ** (0.007) -0.069 ** (0.012) -0.079 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 3 years 0.056 ** (0.006) 0.095 ** (0.015) 0.061 ** (0.005) 
Tenure 4 years 0.136 ** (0.006) 0.149 ** (0.014) 0.139 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 5 years 0.146 ** (0.007) 0.170 ** (0.016) 0.151 ** (0.006) 
Share of workers with real wage reduction 0.684 ** (0.033) 0.737 ** (0.062) 0.688 ** (0.031) 
Relative employment change  0.005  (0.009) -0.026 ** (0.007) -0.009 (0.007) 
Share of medium-skilled workers 0.032  (0.091) -0.045  (0.202) -0.000 (0.085) 
Share of high-skilled workers -0.115  (0.130) -0.017  (0.283) -0.116 (0.126) 
Share of female workers 0.012  (0.108) -0.418  (0.304) 0.152 (0.122) 
Share of German workers 0.039  (0.158) 0.652  (0.591) 0.106 (0.210) 
Share of workers with 1 year tenure 0.074  (0.062) 0.074  (0.137) 0.115 * (0.058) 
Share of workers with 2 years tenure -0.024  (0.067) 0.152  (0.147) 0.014 (0.067) 
Share of workers with 3 years tenure -0.025  (0.046) 0.059  (0.109) -0.034 (0.043) 
Share of workers with 4 years tenure -0.042  (0.026) 0.020  (0.084) -0.045 (0.026) 
Share of workers with 5 years tenure 0.022  (0.028) -0.014  (0.088) 0.029 (0.028) 
Share of workers with first job -0.102  (0.102) -0-108  (0.264) 0.031 (0.116) 
Good profit situation -0.015 * (0.007) 0.004  (0.015) -0.011 (0.006) 
Plant size 1–20 0.010  (0.051) 0.181  (0.207) 0.114 (0.091) 
Plant size 21–200 0.021  (0.025) -0.012  (0.040) 0.012 (0.021) 
Plant size 501–2000 -0.003  (0.021) 0.001  (0.039) -0.028 (0.018) 
Plant size larger than 2000 -0.065  (0.033) 0.059  (0.061) -0.059 * (0.029) 
Medium-skilled * share medium-skilled 0.095 * (0.048) -0.081  (0.073) 0.086 * (0.044) 
High-skilled * share high-skilled 0.012  (0.060) 0.026  (0.097) -0.003 (0.049) 
Female * share females 0.018  (0.020) 0.103 * (0.046) 0.038 * (0.018) 
German * share Germans -0.128 * (0.054) -0.173  (0.109) -0.131 * (0.051) 
Tenure 3 years * share tenure 3 years 0.061  (0.053) 0.153  (0.139) 0.021 (0.048) 
Tenure 4 years * share tenure 4 years 0.061  (0.054) 0.045  (0.143) 0.079 (0.052) 
Tenure 5 years * share tenure 5 years 0.013  (0.047) 0.008  (0.137) 0.042 (0.050) 
Wage residual * share real wage reduction -0.007  (0.061) 0.154  (0.155) 0.021 (0.061) 
Medium-skilled * share real wage reduction -0.056 * (0.029) 0.064  (0.052) -0.049 (0.026) 
High-skilled * share wage reduction -0.147 ** (0.046) -0.087  (0.088) -0.147 ** (0.039) 
Female * share wage reduction -0.082 ** (0.020) -0.133 * (0.051) -0.082 ** (0.021) 
German * share wage reduction -0.086 * (0.038) -0.130 ** (0.045) -0.081 ** (0.031) 
Tenure 3 years * share real wage reduction 0.129 ** (0.027) 0.223  (0.051) 0.157 ** (0.025) 
Tenure 4 years * share real wage reduction 0.311 ** (0.028) 0.380  (0.049) 0.363 ** (0.025) 
Tenure 5 years * share real wage reduction 0.363 ** (0.029) 0.397  (0.049) 0.402 ** (0.025) 
Number of observations 74,949 12,317 88,286 
R
2 
(overall) 0.134 0.168 0.137  
Notes: The data set used is the LIAB cross-sectional model, waves 2000–2006. Only workers in their first job and with at 
most 5 years tenure are included. **/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5 per cent level, where robust standard errors 
are clustered at the plant level. Reference group: low-skilled worker with 2 years of tenure working for a plant with 201–500 
employees with neither a works council nor a collective agreement; further regressors included are 16 sector and 6 year 
dummies and a constant. All estimates include plant fixed effects and are thus comparable to Model 3 in Table 2. In all 
interaction terms, the shares of workers with certain characteristics and of workers hit by a real wage reduction are centred 








Table A1:  Wage regression including plant fixed effects for the year 2000 
Regressand: log wage Plant FE 
Regressors: Coef.  SE 
Medium-skilled (occupational degree) 0.145 ** (0.004) 
High-skilled (academic degree)  0.551 ** (0.007) 
Female  -0.137 ** (0.002) 
German  0.045 ** (0.003) 
Age 0.021 ** (0.001) 
Age squared/100 -0.020 ** (0.000) 
Tenure 0.018 ** (0.001) 
Tenure squared/100 -0.035 ** (0.002) 
Tenure before the job 2–5 years  0.006 ** (0.002) 
Tenure before the job 6–10 years 0.023 ** (0.002) 
Tenure before the job more than 10 years 0.058 ** (0.003) 
First job 0.002 (0.002) 
Number of observations: 1,477,192  R
2
 (overall): 0.357 
 
Notes: The data set used is the LIAB cross-sectional model, waves 2000–2006. **/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5 




Table A2:  Individual probability of facing a real wage reduction (10 years of tenure) 
Dependent variable: dummy for real wage reduction Plant FE 
Regressors:  Coef.  SE 
Tenure 3 years 0.060 ** (0.005) 
Tenure 4 years 0.135 ** (0.005) 
Tenure 5 years 0.145 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 6 years 0.159 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 7 years 0.181 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 8 years 0.193 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 9 years 0.201 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 10 years 0.212 ** (0.006) 
Tenure 3 years * share tenure 3 years 0.023 (0.041) 
Tenure 4 years * share tenure 4 years 0.064 (0.043) 
Tenure 5 years * share tenure 5 years -0.000 (0.037) 
Tenure 6 years * share tenure 6 years 0.075 * (0.037) 
Tenure 7 years * share tenure 7 years -0.007 (0.042) 
Tenure 8 years * share tenure 8 years 0.048 ** (0.013) 
Tenure 9 years * share tenure 9 years 0.025 (0.014) 
Tenure 10 years * share tenure 10 years -0.031 (0.020) 
Tenure 3 years * share wage reduction 0.135 ** (0.021) 
Tenure 4 years * share wage reduction 0.284 ** (0.022) 
Tenure 5 years * share wage reduction 0.315 ** (0.023) 
Tenure 6 years * share wage reduction 0.344 ** (0.022) 
Tenure 7 years * share wage reduction 0.395 ** (0.021) 
Tenure 8 years * share wage reduction 0.427 ** (0.023) 
Tenure 9 years * share wage reduction 0.405 ** (0.026) 
Tenure 10 years * share wage reduction 0.454 ** (0.026) 
Number of observations: 417,898 R
2
 (overall): 0.218 
 
Notes: The data set used is the LIAB cross-sectional model, waves 2000–2006. Only workers in their first job and with at 
most 10 years tenure are included. **/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5 per cent level, where robust standard errors 
are clustered at the plant level. Reference group: low-skilled worker with 2 years of tenure working for a plant with 201–500 
employees with neither a works council nor a collective agreement; further regressors included are those from Model 3 in 
Table 2. In all interaction terms, the shares of workers with certain characteristics and of workers hit by a real wage reduction 






Table A3:  Individual probability of job end 
Regressand: dummy for job end Plant FE 
Regressors: Coef.  SE 
Wage residual in previous year -0.109 ** (0.008) 
Medium-skilled (occupational degree) -0.031 ** (0.004) 
High-skilled (academic degree)  -0.025 ** (0.005) 
Female  0.030 ** (0.003) 
German  -0.027 ** (0.004) 
Tenure 3 years -0.027 ** (0.004) 
Tenure 4 years -0.051 ** (0.004) 
Tenure 5 years -0.052 ** (0.004) 
Share of workers with job end 0.882 ** (0.010) 
Relative employment change  -0.001  (0.005) 
Share of medium-skilled workers -0.000  (0.044) 
Share of high-skilled workers 0.034  (0.098) 
Share of female workers -0.072  (0.076) 
Share of German workers 0.132  (0.087) 
Share of workers with 1 year tenure -0.091 ** (0.033) 
Share of workers with 2 years tenure -0.142 ** (0.032) 
Share of workers with 3 years tenure 0.060 * (0.030) 
Share of workers with 4 years tenure 0.024  (0.024) 
Share of workers with 5 years tenure 0.014  (0.019) 
Share of workers with first job 0.470 ** (0.068) 
Expected employment decrease -0.274 ** (0.084) 
Good profit situation -0.011 * (0.005) 
Plant size 1–20 0.015  (0.029) 
Plant size 21–200 -0.019  (0.012) 
Plant size 501–2000 -0.004  (0.014) 
Plant size larger than 2000 -0.026  (0.026) 
Tenure 3 years * share tenure 3 years -0.082 * (0.032) 
Tenure 4 years * share tenure 4 years -0.028  (0.028) 
Tenure 5 years * share tenure 5 years 0.017  (0.029) 
Medium-skilled * share medium-skilled -0.000  (0.020) 
High-skilled * share high-skilled 0.057  (0.029) 
Female * share females 0.003  (0.014) 
German * share Germans -0.070  (0.042) 
Wage residual * share job end 0.135 ** (0.012) 
Tenure 3 years * share job end 0.066 ** (0.008) 
Tenure 4 years * share job end 0.091 ** (0.007) 
Tenure 5 years * share job end 0.099 ** (0.007) 
Medium-skilled * share job end 0.013 * (0.006) 
High-skilled * share job end -0.021 * (0.008) 
Female * share job end -0.045 ** (0.004) 
German * share job end 0.030 ** (0.006) 
Number of observations: 108,003 R
2
 (overall): 0.589 
 
Notes: The data set used is the LIAB cross-sectional model, waves 2000–2006. Only workers in their first job and with at 
most 5 years tenure are included. **/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5 per cent level, where robust standard errors 
are clustered at the plant level. Reference group: low-skilled worker with 2 years of tenure working for a plant with 201–500 
employees with neither a works council nor a collective agreement; further regressors included are 16 sector and 6 year 
dummies and a constant. In all interaction terms, the shares of workers with certain characteristics and of workers hit by a 
real wage reduction are centred around their sample means. 
 
 
